Several recent studies have estimated the responsiveness of mortality to English National Health Service spending. Although broadly similar, the studies differ in how they identify the outcome equation. One approach uses conventional socio-economic variables as instruments for endogenous health care expenditure, whereas the other exploits exogenous elements in the resource allocation formula for local budgets. The former approach has usually been applied to specific disease areas (e.g., for cancer and circulatory disease), whereas the other has only been applied to all-cause mortality. In this letter, we compare the two approaches by using them to estimate the direct all-cause elasticity as well as disease-specific elasticities. We also calculate the implied all-cause elasticity associated with the disease-specific results. We find that the "funding rule" approach to identification can be successfully replicated and applied to disease area models. This is important because disease area models reduce the danger of aggregation bias present in all-cause analysis, and they offer the opportunity to link estimated mortality effects to more complete measures of health outcome that reflect what is currently known about the survival and morbidity disease burden in different programmes.
complicated by the fact that expenditure (both in total and for individual programmes) is likely to be endogenous and, therefore, should be instrumented. Claxton et al. (2015 Claxton et al. ( , 2017 use various socio-economic variables as instruments and their approach has met with some criticism (e.g., Barnsley, Towse, Schaffer, & Sussex, 2013 , question the reliability of expenditure data for individual programme budget categories).
1 Andrews et al. (2017) note that the per capita budget assigned to each health authority is the product the national per capita budget and four adjustments reflecting local circumstances (e.g., the age index reflects the demographic profile of the local population). Andrews et al. (2017) argue that three of these four adjustment factors are uncorrelated with mortality and, therefore, can be used as instruments for total expenditure. Using these so-called "funding rule" instruments, Andrews et al. (2017) report an all-cause elasticity of mortality with respect to NHS expenditure of −0.705 for 2005. This letter reports the findings from an exploratory study that uses the Andrews et al. (2017) funding rule instruments to estimate disease-specific outcome elasticities. This approach builds on the strengths of the studies mentioned above. First, the use of disease-specific expenditure and mortality data facilitates the use of burden of disease information to convert the cost per life year results into more useful cost per QALY estimates. Second, the use of the Andrews et al. (2017) funding rule instruments permits an examination of what impact this alternative approach to identification has on the estimated outcome elasticity and implied cost per QALY of NHS expenditure.
| METHODS
The English NHS is a centrally planned and publicly funded health care system. Its revenue derives almost entirely from national taxation, and access to the system is generally free to the patient. Primary care is an important element of the system, and general practitioners act as gatekeepers to secondary care and pharmaceuticals. The system is organised geographically, with responsibility for the local administration of the NHS devolved to local health authorities. Until April 2013, these authorities were known as Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). PCTs were allocated fixed annual budgets by the national ministry, within which they were expected to meet expenditure on most aspects of health care, including inpatient, outpatient, and community care, primary care, and pharmaceutical prescriptions (Claxton et al., 2015) .
The share of the national budget allocated to each PCT was determined by the Department of Health's funding rule. This rule reflected each PCT's expenditure needs and this, in turn, reflected their population size, age profile, local input prices, and other need factors. Periodically, the Department revised its funding rule and this generated a new target allocation for each PCT. For some PCTs, the new funding rule might result in a large change in its target allocation and, to avoid sudden large reductions in actual allocations (budgets), such changes were usually phased in over a number of years. Andrews et al. (2017, p. 31) note that each PCT's annual allocation of health expenditure could be expressed as
where (a) the age index reflects the demographic profile of the local population; (b) the additional needs index reflects local deprivation and other factors likely to influence the need for health care; (c) the input price index reflects prices in the local health economy; and (d) the distance from target (DFT) index reflects how far each PCT's actual allocation is from its target allocation. The four index adjustments all take a mean value of one (Andrews et al., 2017, p. 31) . The health outcome equation estimated by both Claxton et al. (2015 Claxton et al. ( , 2017 and Andrews et al. (2017) is of the form ln mortality rate ð Þ ¼ln health expenditure per person
where expenditure is likely to be endogenous, the controls reflect the need for health care expenditure, and e reflects everything not included elsewhere in the specification. As controls, Claxton et al. (2015 Claxton et al. ( , 2017 ) use a small number census based indicators of deprivation (e.g., the proportion of lone parent households), whereas Andrews et al. (2017) use measures of education deprivation and income deprivation in older people. The use of different controls by the two research teams is considered to be of relatively little importance.
However, there is considerably more debate about the appropriate approach to identification. In their disease-specific work, Claxton et al. (2015 Claxton et al. ( , 2017 use various socio-economic variables (such as the proportion of the population providing unpaid care) as instruments for expenditure. For their all-cause specification, Andrews et al. (2017) argue that there is no need to use these variables as instruments because three of the four adjustment factors in (1) are unlikely to be correlated with mortality and, therefore, are appropriate instruments for total expenditure. The only exception is the additional needs index that is potentially endogenous because it contains historical mortality (reverse causation). Using three of these so-called funding rule variables as instruments, Andrews et al. (2017) report an all-cause elasticity of mortality with respect to NHS expenditure of −0.705 for 2005.
With only an all-cause elasticity and no disease-specific detail, it is very difficult to convert the Andrews et al. (2017) elasticity to a cost per QALY basis. To overcome this problem, we re-estimate Equation 2 for the four largest (in terms of mortality) disease categories: for cancer, circulatory disease, respiratory disease, and gastro-intestinal problems. As our starting point, we use the funding rule variables identified by Andrews et al. (2017) as instruments. Theory provides little guidance as to the appropriate controls so, following Claxton et al. (2015) , we identify a dozen socio-economic variables such as the proportion of lone pensioner households, the proportion of the population providing unpaid care, and the proportion of owner-occupied households.
For each disease area, we start by estimating (2) with all socio-economic variables included as controls. The least significant regressor is removed from the specification and the equation is re-estimated. This process-of dropping the least significant regressor and re-estimating-continues until there are only significant controls remaining. This specification becomes our preferred result if it also passes the appropriate statistical tests (e.g., the instruments are valid, and the instruments are strong) but, if this is not the case, the specification is adjusted (e.g., an invalid instrument is removed) and the equation is re-estimated. Table 1 shows our preferred specifications for the all-cause and the four disease-specific models. In all five cases, the test statistics show that expenditure is endogenous, that the instruments are valid, and that they can be considered to be strong instruments (F statistic value about 10 or better).
| RESULTS
Column (1) reveals that the outcome elasticity for the all-cause model is −1.089. As all variables are measured as logarithms, this implies that 1% increase in expenditure per person is associated with a 1.089% reduction in mortality. .241
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Note. Robust standard errors in brackets. The gastro-intestinal specification also includes two squared controls (households with no car and population with a limiting long-term illness). PCTs = Primary Care Trusts. ***p < .01, **p < .05.
This specification excludes the "distance from target" variable as an instrument because the Hansen-Sargan test statistic suggests that this is not a valid instrument. The outcome elasticity for expenditure on cancer is −0.272 (see Column (2)). This result includes all three funding rule variables as instruments. Column (3) reveals a significant outcome elasticity (= −2.450) for expenditure on circulatory disease and again this result includes all three funding rule variables as instruments.
Column (4) shows that the outcome elasticity for expenditure on respiratory disease is −2.194 and that this figure is statistically significant at the 5% level. This result only incorporates a single instrument (the input price index), although a very similar result is obtainable (with a coefficient of −2.355) if the MFF index is added to the specification. However, the addition of this extra instrument generates a slightly weaker set of instruments (Kleibergen-Paap F statistic = 7.070), so we favour the single instrument specification (Angrist & Pischke, 2009) .
Finally, the outcome elasticity for expenditure on gastro-intestinal problems is −2.888 (see Column (5)) and this estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level. This result also omits one of the funding rule variables (the DFT index) as the Hansen-Sargan test suggests that this is not a valid instrument.
| DISCUSSION
The results presented above can be compared with previous estimates. First, the all-cause outcome elasticity (= −1.089) is slightly larger (absolutely) than that (= −0.705) reported by Andrews et al. (2017) for the same year (2005) The all-cause elasticity reported in Table 1 (= −1.089) can also be compared with the implied all-cause elasticity obtained from disease-specific work. Claxton et al. (2017) use data on mortality and expenditure to estimate diseasespecific outcome elasticities for 2005. These elasticities can be used to calculate an implied all-cause elasticity (= −1.372) and its associated 95% confidence interval (−1.905, −0.890). The directly estimated all-cause elasticity might be smaller (absolutely) than the implied all-cause value from the disease-specific results due to the presence of aggregation bias in the directly estimated all-cause specification.
The disease-specific (all programme) outcome elasticities reported in Table 1 and summarised in Column 1 of Table 2 can be compared with disease-specific (own programme) outcome elasticities obtained with the use of a different set of (non-funding rule) instruments. Claxton et al. (2017) use various socio-economic indicators as instruments and the outcome elasticities associated with a change in own programme expenditure are shown in the second column of Table 2 . These elasticities are associated with a small change in own programme expenditure so they cannot be directly compared with the elasticities shown in Column 1 because the latter reflect a small change in the total (not own programme) budget. Fortunately, however, Claxton et al. (2017) also report expenditure elasticities; these show the change in own programme expenditure that is associated with a change in total budget (see Column 3 of Table 2 ). If we form the product of the elasticities shown in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 , we obtain the elasticities shown in Column 4 and, as these reflect the responsiveness of mortality to a small change in total budget, they can be directly compared with the outcome elasticities shown in Table 1 and reproduced in Column 1 of Table 2 . This comparison reveals that the choice of instruments has virtually no impact on the elasticities for both cancer and circulatory disease. The funding rule outcome elasticity for respiratory disease is slightly smaller than that obtained with the use of socio-economic instruments, and the funding rule outcome elasticity for gastro-intestinal problems is larger than that obtained with the use of socioeconomic instruments. One advantage of the funding rule approach over that of Claxton et al. (2015 Claxton et al. ( , 2017 is that, by using total expenditure rather than individual programme expenditure, it is less susceptible to questions about the reliability of individual programme budget data. Moreover, the study of the impact of own programme expenditure on PBC outcome means that the resulting elasticity is unable to reflect the impact of other programme expenditure on own programme mortality. Similarly, own programme expenditure might be contributing to other programme mortality. If co-morbidities are important, we would expect the (all budget) outcome elasticities to be larger (absolutely) than the own programme outcome elasticities because the former will reflect the impact of spending in all programmes on programme-specific mortality, whereas the own programme outcome elasticities will only reflect spending in the specific programme.
| CONCLUSION
Although these results are only for one year and only for four programmes, they provide no evidence to suggest that an entirely different approach to identification generates materially different results. These findings also suggest that the funding rule approach to identification can be successfully replicated and applied to disease area models. This is important because disease area models reduce the danger of aggregation bias present in all-cause analysis, and they offer the opportunity to link estimated mortality effects to more complete measures of health outcome that reflect what is currently known about the survival and morbidity disease burden in different programmes.
The funding rule approach to instrumentation combined with its application at disease area level is likely to provide a secure foundation for re-estimating health opportunity costs as data on expenditure and outcomes by programme evolve in the UK. This approach also points to fruitful ways to investigate health opportunity costs in other health care systems where there are exogenous elements in resource allocation mechanisms.
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